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PANEL IV: MARKET REGULATION AND
INNOVATION
LEGAL AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS IN
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY
Dan L. Burk*
INTRODUCTION
Copyright and similar exclusive rights regimes have long been mainstays
of innovation policy, purporting to provide the incentive necessary to
generate creative and innovative products for the benefit of the public. The
received economic wisdom holds that a period of legal exclusivity allows
the developer of a new creation to recoup the investment made in
development, either by selling the product at higher than marginal cost or
by licensing the work to others who will sell it at higher than marginal
cost.I The supranormal profits generated by excluding the creation or its
close substitutes from the marketplace provide the incentive for the initial
investment in what we term "intellectual property."
To be sure, the promise of a return on investment is important for the
development of all kinds of goods, not merely those we term intellectual
property. However, many products of human endeavor require little or no
developmental encouragement by way of legal exclusion, as these goods
naturally carry the attributes of exclusivity in their form or design. While
tangible goods generally benefit from some legal protection against theft,
there is already a considerable cost to misappropriation of such goods, and
the cost is often substantial enough both to deter pilferage of these products
and ensure a return on the investment needed to create them. Absent a
radical departure from the usual laws of physics, it is difficult to walk away
with a building,2 or to feed a multitude with five loaves and two fish.3
* Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Copyright
2004 by Dan L. Burk.
1. See William M. Landes & Richard E. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326-27 (1985).
2. See Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1997).
3. See Matthew 15:32-38, 16:21; cf Exodus 16:4. One of the common themes of
mythologies around the world is that, terrestrial scarcity notwithstanding, the gods
miraculously provide private goods as if they were public goods. See Hugh Nibley, Work We
Must, but the Lunch Is Free in Approaching Zion 202, 217 (Don E. Norton, ed. 1989).
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Height, depth, breadth, weight, mass, and entropy endow tangible goods
with a ready-made scarcity.
However, where the primary value of a good lies in its creative or
innovative character, rather than in its physical qualities, the resistance of
tangible form to tangible appropriation offers little natural deterrence to
appropriation of its more ephemeral qualities. Individual instantiations of
intellectual property are certainly embodied in particular physical forms-
on paper, on canvas, on magnetic or optical media-that can be guarded
from a physical theft.4 But once the physical object is made accessible by
publication, sale, or otherwise, the ideas, information, or artistic content
embodied become exposed to copying or imitation.
The potential for such copying or imitation of intellectual property is
generally a function of technological progress. In particular, recent
advances in computer and networking technologies have greatly enabled the
appropriation of ephemeral products. Digitization eliminates much of the
physical character of creative works, embodying creativity as ethereal bits
rather than material atoms. As digital technology proliferates and becomes
increasingly interconnected, regimes of legal exclusion become increasingly
difficult to police and enforce.5 Historically, reproduction and distribution
of materially embedded works required the costly technology necessary to
manipulate and transport tangible products, and so limited the capability for
unauthorized appropriation to a relative few, highly-capitalized actors; but
the technology to accomplish digitized reproduction and distribution is now
available at low cost, transforming individuals of relatively modest means
into potential infringers.
While the proliferation of digital technology raises the cost of policing
and enforcing legal exclusion, the same technology may also offer the
producers of intangible goods an alternative method of exclusion. Because
digital technology is capable of virtually modeling structural reality,6 it can
be programmed to mimic the characteristics of tangible property. Producers
of intellectual property may therefore resort to a form of self-help by re-
embedding intangible goods in digital rights management systems, or
"DRM," that simulate the natural appropriability resistance of physical
goods. 7 Such technological controls prohibit or constrain the copying and
distribution that digital formats invite. By essentially transforming public
4. See I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog
Works and Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 Dayton L. Rev. 211, 214 (2001).
In copyright, the distinction between creative character and particular physical instantiations
is maintained by the legal definition of "copy" and "work." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Failure to maintain the distinction between the copy and the work can lead to serious
analytical error regarding the treatment of the work's creative value. See, e.g., Hardy, supra,
at 215.
5. See Computer Sci. & Telecomm. Bd. Nat'l Res. Council, The Digital Dilemma:
Intellectual Property in the Information Age 153 (2000) [hereinafter The Digital Dilemma]
6. See Philip E. Agre, Internet Research: For and Against, in I Internet Research
Annual: Selected Papers from the Association of Internet Researchers Conferences 2000-
2002, at 25, 27 (Mia Consalvo et al. eds., 2004).
7. See generally Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, Sci. Am., Mar. 1997, at 78.
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goods back into private goods, owners of intellectual property may
introduce into the design of digital media the more congenial constraints of
more traditional media. Indeed, the constraints imposed by DRM may, in
some cases, be designed to exceed those of traditional media.
But in order to reproduce the natural constraints of tangible form, DRM
must constrain user interaction with the same predictability as physical
matter. The goal of deploying reliable and deterministic constraints on user
behavior simultaneously drives the character of this self-help technology in
relation to both legal and technical standards. 8 These characteristics of
DRM occur simultaneously within two different contexts similarly labeled.
The terminology of "standards" has been employed differently, and to some
extent contrarily, in legal and technical parlance. 9 In legal discourse,
"standards" nomenclature has referred to flexible and fact-specific legal
imperatives, used for ex post decisional determinations. In technological
discourse, "standards" nomenclature has referred to uniform technical
specifications. Yet, as shown in the following pages, these differing
terminologies intersect and converge in the structure of DRM: As the goal
of determinism confines the discretion and flexibility governing use of
technologically protected materials, it also dictates uniformity and
exclusivity in technological design.
In examining the relationship between these characteristics, this Article
first take up the problem of DRM as a substitute for legal standards,
describing the constraints imposed by adopting technological rather than
legal protections.' 0 This Article then considers the influence of DRM on
technological standards, including both the advantages and disadvantages of
convergence on a preferred rights management technology. 11  Part IV
discusses the impact of layering legal protection, in the form of anti-
circumvention statutes, over such technical standards, with particular
attention to the effects of such legal protections on competitive behavior. 12
Part V then turns to a discussion of several recent cases that demonstrate
these effects, but that also demonstrate the emerging judicial initiatives to
ameliorate the potential for anticompetitive outcomes. 13 I conclude by
considering the prospects for these judicial initiatives, and the need for
further reforms. 14
8. John S. Erickson & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dangers of Code-
Based Fair Use Enforcement, 92 Proc. of the IEEE 985, 985 (2004).
9. Daniel Benoliel has recently made a similar point along these lines. See Daniel
Benoliel, Technological Standards Inc.: Rethinking Cyberspace Regulatory Epistemology,
92 Cal. L. Rev. 1069, 1091 (2004) (proposing a new nomenclature for technical standards
due to their centralized regulatory nature).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Parts II, III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part VI.
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I. REGULATORY DESIGN
The design of technological artifacts may be shaped by a variety of
factors: the cost of production, the availability of materials, the expectation
of purchasers, even the current whims of fashion. Each of these social and
economic factors affects the characteristics of the product and, ultimately,
the way in which the artifact may be used. Indeed, products are typically
designed with certain uses in mind, and so imbued with characteristics that
allow some uses and disallow others. In some cases, behavior is
inadvertently channeled via routine technological design decisions
regarding the size, shape, material, or placement of everyday artifacts. But
frequently size, shape, material, or placement of artifacts is calculated to
produce a particular result.
DRM constitutes an exceptionally complex and sophisticated attempt to
delimit the behavior of consumers; however, it is hardly the first such
attempt, nor the most prevalent. The intentional design of technologies to
constrain or prompt certain behaviors is relatively common. For example,
Bruno Latour illustrates his discussion of such constraints via the example
of speed bumps along a roadway.15 These intentional bumps in the road are
safely negotiated at lower speeds, but cause uncomfortable jolts, as well as
potential damage to automobile suspension systems, if the mild obstructions
are negotiated at higher speeds. 16 Latour dubs these structures "sleeping
policemen," as they serve to keep traffic speeds down, accomplishing much
the same result as posting actual traffic officers along the route. 17
As the example of speed bumps suggests, the interaction between the
design of human artifacts and the users of those artifacts defines certain
types of behavior accompanying the artifact. Scholars studying the social
effects of technology have long observed that such "social shaping" is
routinely accomplished through design that recruits the end user into a
particular social role. i8 As in a stage play or film, roles follow a particular
instruction set, or script. But in the case of artifactual design, the script is
built into the shape or characteristics of the artifact, and user responses to
the artifact are channeled into certain predefined roles. The shape,
placement, and physical qualities of speed bumps compose a behavioral
script prompting human drivers to slow down. In essence, the design of the
speed bump is inscribed with the instruction "Slow Down."
15. Bruno Latour, Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane
Artifacts, in Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change 225,




18. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barley, The Alignment of Technology and Structure Through
Roles and Networks, 35 Admin. Sci. Q. 61 (1990); Hugh Mackay et al., Reconfiguring the
User: Using Rapid Application Development, 30 Soc. Stud. Sci. 737, 737 (2000); Steve
Woolgar, Configuring the User. The Case of Usability Trials, in A Sociology of Monsters:
Essays on Power, Technology and Domination 57 (John Law ed., 1991).
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Such technological regulation or "scripting" is relatively easy to see in
human artifacts once one begins to look for it. Childproof bottle cap
configurations deter consumption of pharmaceuticals by children lacking
the manual strength or dexterity to open the bottle. Pillars or other
architectural barriers afford passages too narrow to accommodate the width
of shopping carts, deterring removal and ultimate loss of shopping carts
from the immediate premises of grocery stores. Turnstiles ratchet in one
direction only, channeling subway riders or sports fans into a particular
space via a particular route, and preventing exit through the same portal.
One-way retractable roadway spikes allow vehicles to proceed in one
direction only, as backing the vehicle up would risk severe tire damage.
In digital media, a similar physical design "script" might be illustrated by
the recent production of digital video discs ("DVDs") that, much like the
anonymous directive audio tapes in the old Mission: Impossible television
show, self-destruct after use. The DVDs are formed of a substance that
degrades after the packaging is opened, limiting the life of the product after
purchase. 19 The discs are composed of a polymer that begins to darken
when exposed to air; when the reaction reaches a certain degree of opacity,
the data on the disc can no longer be read by the laser in a playback
machine. The polymer can be formulated so that the darkening process
takes twenty-four, forty-eight, or some other specified number of hours, so
that the consumer essentially pays for a set period of access to the content.
The process can reportedly be slowed by refrigeration, but eventual
illegibility is an irreversible characteristic of the product's physical
structure.
The design of such DVDs is significant in part because it allows the
producer to price discriminate among purchasers with different
preferences. 20 Purchasers who wish to view a movie once or twice can
purchase, for a low price, a DVD that will be viable for twenty-four hours.
Purchasers who may wish to view a movie multiple times can for a higher
price purchase a DVD with a longer life span. Purchasers who wish a
permanent copy of the movie to be held in the purchaser's video library and
viewed multiple times presumably attribute the greatest value to the movie
and can be charged a relatively high price for a copy that does not self-
destruct. The characteristics of the physical disc carrying the movie
determine the behavior of the purchaser toward the disc, and consequently
the price that can be charged for the disc.
The adoption of such design-based behavioral regulation may sometimes
be mandated by the state, or sometimes spontaneously adopted by private
manufacturers, or a combination of both, depending upon the natural and
desired incentive structure for adoption. Regulatory designs may be
desirable where the cost of monitoring and enforcing the desired behavior
19. Eric A. Taub, DVDs Meant for Buying but Not for Keeping, N.Y. Times, July 21,
2003, at C1.
20. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright
Protection of Digital Works, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 845, 877-80 (1997).
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via human agency is too high-the cost of situating actual policemen along
every roadway in order to enforce speed limits would be prohibitive; speed
bumps may prompt the desired speed limit compliance at a lower cost. In
the case of DVDs, the monitoring and policing of the number of home
viewings of a standard DVD, in order to charge according to consumer
usage, would be invasive and costly. Offering time-limited DVDs allows
consumers to self select high or low value versions at the point of purchase.
The relative cost of such self-enforcing mechanisms is equally important
when determining whether to employ regulatory designs or other behavioral
mechanisms to reach a desired result. In particular, regulatory design can in
some instances serve as a substitute for legal regulation. Thus, Latour's
"sleeping policemen" may act as a speed-limiting device even in the
absence of a formal statute or ordinance regulating vehicular speed. Latour
similarly describes how automobile seatbelts with ignition interlocks, which
require the seatbelt to be buckled before the ignition will start, embody a
type of "script" requiring a driver to take the particular action of fastening
the seatbelt before driving.2 1 This requirement might otherwise be enforced
by a statute or ordinance requiring the use of seatbelts. Similarly, a locked
door effectively embodies a "script" or rule against unauthorized entry,
whether or not a formal law forbids such unauthorized entry.
Dozens of such examples could be cited, and the interaction between
regulatory design and regulatory enactments is complex. Frequently both
are used as complements or reinforcements for one another in order to
produce the desired behavioral outcomes. This is particularly the case
where regulatory designs would provide the most efficient means for
prompting a particular behavior but, due to externalities, the incentives to
adopt such designs are lacking or improperly distributed. Consider, for
example, the case in which the state wishes to enforce safety standards by
requiring all automobile drivers to use seatbelts. 22 The most direct method
to produce the desired behavior is to pass laws penalizing the failure to use
such harnesses, but this approach incurs law enforcement costs to detect
and punish driving without buckling up. An alternative method to produce
the desired behavior, suggested by Latour, is to fit automobiles with seatbelt
ignition interlocks; 23 but this must be done by the manufacturer, at a cost
that will likely be passed on to consumers, resulting in higher purchase
prices and fewer sales for manufacturers. Neither the manufacturers nor the
purchasers may be willing to incur such costs in return for societal savings
in safety that seems to each remote.
However, the state may implement the technological alternative through
a variety of regulatory mechanisms, from a variety of sources. Most
directly, the state might simply require automobile manufacturers to install
21. See Latour, supra note 15, at 225-26. See generally Madeleine Akrich, The De-
Scription of Technical Objects, in Shaping Technology/Building Society, supra note 15, at
205.
22. See Latour, supra note 15, at 225-27.
23. Id. at 225.
[Vol. 74
LEGAL AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS
seatbelt interlocks on all cars produced. 24  Alternatively, courts, or
legislatures acting through courts, could impose liability for deaths or
injuries on manufacturers who fail to install seatbelt interlocks, creating an
incentive to include the feature in cars. Similar liability could be imposed
on car drivers or owners, creating a consumer demand for manufacturers to
install the devices. Ancillary social actors, such as insurers, may also be
mobilized to ensure installation of the technological feature. For example,
if liability is imposed on drivers who fail to adopt the technology, insurance
payments for such drivers will likely increase. Insurers will presumably
decrease premiums for drivers who lessen their liability by adopting the
technology, partially subsidizing the cost of adoption. These alternatives
may be superior to a direct design mandate, potentially invoking market
forces to develop better versions of the technology at cheaper prices, rather
than requiring adoption of a particular technological configuration by state
fiat.
While the example of seatbelts or speed bumps largely implicates
technological design as a substitute or complement for the public goods
mediated by tort and criminal law, regulatory designs can also substitute for
contract where private transactions are concerned. For example, it is
possible to consider the design of a limited-use DVD, facilitating producer
price discrimination, as a substitute for contractual provisions designed to
accomplish a similar end. Such contractual provisions may be used to limit
product uses in ways that intellectual property law does not. Copyright law
affords the owners of digital content recourse against many unauthorized
uses of their material, but copyright is subject to a host of uses that require
no authorization from the copyright holder. 25 Prominent among these uses
is the ability of a purchaser to dispose of a copy by resale or other means
under copyright's "first sale" doctrine. Under this doctrine, ownership of
the incorporeal work and ownership of the tangible embodiment are
effectively bifurcated. Thus, a consumer may purchase a book, painting, or
DVD and may typically dispose of the physical object however she
pleases-by reselling it, giving it away to a friend, tossing it into the trash
bin or setting it on fire. What the owner of the physical object typically
may not do is dispose of it in one of a small number of restricted manners
that implicate the embodied work-using the object as a template for
making additional copies, for example.
A scheme of price discrimination is nearly impossible to maintain under
such conditions, as the supplier of the intangible work is unable to prevent
buyer arbitrage. 26 Low-valuing purchasers might obtain DVDs and resell
them at higher prices to high-valuing purchasers, bypassing the DVD
24. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 133-40
(1990).
25. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112 (2000) (detailing numerous and varied exceptions to
the exclusive rights of the copyright holder, such as the right to perform non-dramatic
musical works at agricultural fairs or in the classroom).
26. See Meurer, supra note 20, at 874-75.
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producer and pocketing the surplus. Owners of digital content have long
wished to escape the "first sale" doctrine and similarly inconvenient
consumer privileges afforded by copyright law. They have attempted to do
so through the fiction of the "shrink-wrap" or "click-wrap" license, which
purports to restrict a purchaser's use of the accompanying product.27 The
license takes its name from the legal fiction that the purchaser demonstrates
agreement to the license terms by breaking the "shrink-wrap" cellophane on
the product package or, more recently, by using the computer mouse cursor
to click on a graphic labeled "I agree."'28 Because such an agreement is
styled as a license, rather than a sale, it negates the privileges afforded by
first sale.
Such licenses might appear to provide a solution to the arbitrage problem
faced by the producer of a copyrighted work, such as a movie contained on
a DVD. A restriction on resale might be included as part of the license
accompanying the work. However, the road to legal acceptance for such
agreements has been long and tortuous. 29 Courts in the United States have
in many cases been reluctant to enforce such agreements because in the
classic shrink-wrap format, the purchaser may have no opportunity to
review the license prior to opening the package. 30 In some circumstances,
such licenses may be limited by contract doctrines of unconscionability, or
preempted by federal policy governing the rights the contract seeks to
allocate. 31 Some commentators have suggested that overreaching attempts
to limit consumer exemptions and privileges granted under the statute could
run afoul of federal copyright policy.32 And even if such licenses become
more frequently enforceable, it remains extremely difficult for copyright
holders to police such agreements.
Consequently, regulatory design may be an attractive lower-cost
alternative to policing and enforcing such legally troublesome agreements.
But these lowered enforcement costs must be balanced against other,
possibly significant, costs entailed in adopting the design option. All
regulatory design involves such costs-not simply the cost of the creating
structure itself, but the costs implicit in the behavior deterred. Latour's
"sleeping policemen" exact a price whenever excessive speed would be
justified, as in an emergency, when police or rescue vehicles might be
27. See Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed Software: The Legality of the Form License
Agreement, 48 La. L. Rev. 87, 95-126 (1987). See generally David W. Maher, The Shrink-
Wrap License: Old Problems in a New Wrapper, 34 J. Copyright Soc'y 292 (1987).
28. Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 Jurimetrics J. 311 (1995).
29. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002).
30. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111, 120 & n.19 (1999); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1249-59 (1995).
31. See Niva Elkin-Koren, A Public-Regarding Approach to Contracting Over
Copyrights, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the
Knowledge Society 191, 199-207 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
32. See David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 Cal. L.
Rev. 17, 67 (1999).
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required to use the speed-impaired roadway. Childproof bottle caps may
impair the fingers of the elderly; barriers intended to deter the theft of
shopping carts may impede the access of shoppers in wheelchairs, or of
shoppers employing strollers for children; turnstiles may create bottlenecks
during rush hour or at times when a large crowd needs to move in the
opposite direction-to exit the station or arena, for example.
These costs arise out of the inability of the design structure to
accommodate unforeseen or unacknowledged contingencies. Unlike
policemen, speed bumps lack the capacity to recognize and permit socially
beneficial speeding. Childproof vial caps lack the capacity to recognize and
permit access to an individual who shares with children a lack of manual
strength, but differs from children in maturity and discernment. Redesign
that removes human agency also removes human discrimination, leaving
potentially costly situations outside the access parameters of the design. If
the costly contingent situations occur infrequently, the design structure may
still constitute a net benefit. But if the contingent situations occur more
frequently than expected, or are of a serious nature, regulatory design can
become costly, although perhaps not to the same set of actors to whom the
savings accrue-policemen rather than ambulances, the elderly rather than
the very young.
This observation holds equally true where regulatory design is targeted to
facilitate a private goal such as price discrimination. Price discrimination
itself entails costs, and may not always be beneficial from the standpoint of
wealth transfer.33 More importantly, the standard optimistic model of price
discrimination assumes that the purchaser and the supplier of the good
know and internalize the proper social value of the goods being exchanged,
and factor that into the price. But some costs and some benefits may be
unforeseen, unknowable, external to the parties, or simply too diffuse for
them to contemplate. For example, past instances of the irretrievable
cultural loss of important motion pictures due to unforeseen deterioration of
available copies might give us pause when contemplating a future where
many or most of the DVD copies of a motion picture are subject to
intentional deterioration. The social and cultural importance of preserving a
cultural work, and the survival value of having multiple intact copies of a
motion picture in circulation, are not likely to be part of the supply and
demand pricing calculus in deciding whether to issue self-destructing
DVDs. Similarly, there may well be important but unforeseen social value
in having intact and unencumbered copies of motion pictures in the
possession of purchasers-unconsidered entertainment value to another
member of the household, unintentional inspirational value to a future
director or producer, or serendipitous educational value to a child who finds
the disc upon a shelf. None of these positive externalities is likely to be
taken into account in issuing or purchasing a self-destructing DVD, either.
33. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1799, 1801




The physical character of a self-destructing DVD effectively replaces a
licensing provision directed to first sale, accomplishing the same end as a
shrink-wrapped prohibition on resale or limitation on use. But the
composition of such structures provides a relatively simple design script,
replacing the behavior expected under a relatively simple contract. To
induce more complex behaviors of the sort expected under more complex
contracts would require product designs capable of incorporating more
complex scripts. Computer software, for example, comprises a
technological artifact that can be programmed or scripted to "behave," that
is, to perform complex functions specified by a programmer. 34 These
complex functions are indeed "scripted," arising from the grammatical
quality of computer technologies that allows for explicit inscription of
discourse within their design.35  The physical construction of a door
enforces a particular prohibition, just as the electromechanical "script" of an
ignition interlock enforces its particular prohibition, but these artifacts are
not programmable in the sense that software may be programmed with a
wide range of attributes. To a far greater extent than speed bumps or seat
belts, digital technologies carry the capacity to embody highly sophisticated
behavioral inscriptions that can accompany copies of a creative work as
they are distributed, controlling uses of the work.36 Consequently, because
digital technologies can be scripted to accommodate a variety of user
behaviors, such controls can be scripted to incorporate restrictions that
might otherwise be the subject matter of a written license.
To this end, copyright owners have begun deploying sophisticated
software "lock-out" systems that prevent access to digitized content except
on the terms dictated by the owner. 37 These devices may take a variety of
forms as hardware or software or some combination of the two.38 Such
content management software may govern a wide range of user behaviors,
such as the number of times a work may be accessed, the duration of access,
the ability to reproduce or transmit the work, or the payment schedule for
additional access. 39
34. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2316 (1994) (describing software as a text
that "behaves").
35. See Agre, supra note 6, at 26-27.
36. See generally The Digital Dilemma, supra note 5, at 153-76; Mark Stefik, Shifting
the Possible: How Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 137, 139 (1997).
37. See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161, 161-62 (1997); Kenneth W. Dam,
Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Legal Stud. 393, 400 (1999).
38. See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why
Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 15, 38-45
(1997).
39. See Stefik, supra note 36, at 138-46.
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Technological control systems may be used to prevent initial access to
digital content without the permission of the content owner, for example, by
provision of a password. Such access might be occasioned upon terms of
payment or terms of usage for the protected content. The technology may
also be designed to control behaviors that occur after access; for example,
the DRM system might be programmed to permit only one playback of a
work, or allow only one copy of a work to be printed. Technological
control systems may tie access or use of the work to a certain machine, or,
when attached to a network or other signaling device, monitor the degree
and type of use of the work-perhaps to meter payment by the minute, by
the bit, or by some other unit of usage. They may allow different levels of
use depending on the level of payment made. Contingent or alternative
terms might be programmed into the system, allowing a single access for a
certain fee, or unlimited access for a higher fee. Access might even be
revoked automatically, or by remote command, if payments are not made in
a timely fashion.40
In any of these applications, the technological constraints programmed
into the system provide a self-enforcing substitute for legal constraints.41
For example, rather than agreeing in a written license that as a condition of
access the user will make only one copy of the content, the technological
controls may be built to allow only one copy to be made. 42 Rather than
agreeing in a written license that as a condition of access, the user will pay a
fixed price for a copy of the content, the technological controls may be built
to require a credit card number upon access-an account which will, via an
Internet connection, be charged an incremental price when a copy is
made. 43  Technological protection may also be combined with legal
mechanisms; for example, access to technologically controlled content may
be provisioned on agreement to a "click-wrap"-type license that purports to
restrict the permissible uses of the work.44 Indeed, where technological
controls are used in combination with "click-wrap" licensing, the terms may
be enforced by the control system itself.45
The implications of this development are striking. As both Larry Lessig
and Joel Reidenberg have pointed out, technical standards are within the
control of the designer, and so confer upon the designer the power to
40. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1089 (1998).
41. See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and
Machine, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1125, 1138 (2002).
42. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management in Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998).
43. See Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine Is in the Machine, in The Future of
Copyright in a Digital Environment 139 (P. Bernt Hugenholz ed., 1996).
44. See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age,
67 Fordham L. Rev. 1025, 1055-58 (1998).
45. See Bell, supra note 42; Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection
Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licences, 22 Eur. Intell.
Prop. Rep. 198 (2000).
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govern behavior with regard to that system. 46 Once constraints on behavior
are built into the technical standards governing a technology, the technical
standards effectively become a new method for governing use of that
technology-in essence, the technical standards, or "code," become a type
of law. Such technical rule sets may supplement or even supplant the legal
rule sets designed to govern the same behavior. For example, as described
above, the copyright owner may decide that the technological controls will
not permit any copying of the controlled content, whether or not the
copying would be permissible under a statutory user exemption, such as fair
use. Thus, by implementing technical constraints on access to and use of
digital information, a copyright owner can effectively supersede the rules of
intellectual property law.47
But even were the deployment of DRM intended to perfectly mirror the
parameters of copyright law, technological controls and legal controls are
not perfect substitutes for one another. The two forms of constraint differ
in certain aspects, notably in the degree of discretion afforded to the user.
Where legal regulation constitutes the barrier to use of content, users may
breach it at their discretion, avoiding penalties until they are apprehended, if
they are apprehended, and legal process is complete. But when confronted
with analogous technological constraints, unless users are technologically
sophisticated, unauthorized uses are simply impossible. This is in fact
where the potential savings from DRM accrues; because they curtail user
discretion, technological barriers may be less costly for content owners to
police and enforce. Consequently, content owners may prefer to instantiate
the terms of product use as computer code, rather than as contract or
copyright law.
This disparity between legal and technical constraints stems in part from
differences in the formulation of legal imperatives. Legal scholars have for
some time engaged in a long-running debate over the comparative merits of
so-called "rules" versus so-called "standards." 48 Each of these types of
legal imperative entails different costs and benefits, lending themselves to
46. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999); Joel Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 Tex. L.
Rev. 553 (1998); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Dead Hand of the Architect, 19 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 245, 245 (1996) (observing how architectural design dictates academic social
interaction); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1039 (2002)
(discussing building and neighborhood design as a method of channeling behavior).
47. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813, 814, 819-20 (2001).
48. The body of literature on this topic is extensive. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer,
Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law
and in Life (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke
L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:
Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules,
and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 101 (1997); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L.
Rev. 953 (1995).
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differing regulatory situations. Each type of imperative is characterized by
its degree of determinacy and the institution best suited to administer it.
Perhaps most important to the distinction between these types of legal
imperatives is the point at which the legal imperative is created, and
therefore the timing of cost incurred to properly formulate them.
Rules have been characterized as bright-line and definite decisional
criteria.49 Bright-line rules are typically designated before the occurrence
to be regulated. Because they are simple and straightforward, rules are
cheap to administer; the costs of their formulation will be incurred ex
ante.50 But because they are essentially predictive, designating precise
behavior ahead of time, rules are best formulated by an institution equipped
to collect extensive predictive information, typically a legislature. Rules
will tend to be favored where certainty is important, and where decisional
parameters can be most effectively determined on a comprehensive basis
before their application.
Standards, by contrast, are characterized as flexible case-by-case
decisional criteria that can take situational variance into account.51
Standards operationalize case-by-case determinations by laying down a
broad decisional criterion.52 Such decisional flexibility necessarily vests a
fair degree of discretion in a fact finder, typically the judiciary, in order to
adapt the general imperative to the particular circumstance. 53 Because the
precise application of the standard is determined after the fact, standards
shift costs of administration to ex post decision making. 54 Due to their
flexibility and a priori indeterminacy, standards will be favored where the
best outcome cannot be easily foreseen, and so determination after the fact
is more efficient.
In addition to their respective benefits, each of these approaches entails
certain drawbacks as well. Rules offer clear imperatives for behavior, but
this means that they tend to be essentially binary; that is, one is either in
compliance or one is not.55 This in turn means that in their pure form, rules
leave little room for nuance or factual shading. Due to their inflexibility,
they may lead to costly outcomes if they fit a given situation poorly.56
Exceptions to the rule, or excuses and justification for noncompliance, tend
to make them look more like standards. Standards on the other hand tend to
be fuzzier and more fact dependent; because standards are typically and
intentionally stated indeterminately, they offer little guidance as to expected
behavior, and so may generate costs associated with this uncertainty.
49. See Kaplow, supra note 48, at 559-60.
50. See id
51. See id.
52. See id at 596; see also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 278 (1974).
53. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justice of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22
(1992).
54. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 52, at 267.
55. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi L. Rev. 14, 25 (1967).
56. See Kaplow, supra note 48, at 596.
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For example, as I have indicated above,57 access to creative works will
tend to generate serendipitous and external benefits that are unlikely to be
taken into account when setting the price and terms for usage. The inability
of purchasers, and hence of suppliers, to foresee such value militates in
favor of standards-based determinations of conduct; ex ante rule setting is
no more likely to anticipate such value than are participants in the market.
In contrast, an ex post evaluator can on a case-by-case basis take into
account whatever benefit may have come from an unauthorized use. This
standards-based approach is in fact characteristic of the user privileges
under copyright, such as fair use, which involves a fact-specific balancing
of the costs and benefits to a particular action after the action has occurred.
But because of their inherent limitations, regulatory designs are largely
inimical to modeling standards-based decisions. Because the parameters of
the desired behavior are incorporated into the design, regulatory design
most closely resembles rules-based constraints. 58 As in the promulgation of
legal rules, the costs of the constraint are incurred ex ante, as part of the
design process; the anticipated behaviors and responses must be anticipated
as the design is produced. It should come as no surprise that, as in the case
of legal rules, the permissible range of behaviors is sharply delineated,
relatively rigid, and insensitive to factual variation. 59 As in the case of the
self-destructing DVD, situations unanticipated in formulating either rules or
analogous designs will go unaccommodated by either type of constraint.
Despite the sophistication of the scripts incorporated into programmable
technologies, this rule holds as true for DRM as for self-destructing DVDs
or speed bumps. Lacking the deliberative nuance of human agency, DRM
lacks the flexibility to accommodate access or usage that is unforeseen,
unexpected, or unanticipated. 60  Indeed, there is no incentive for the
promulgators of DRM to even attempt to foresee usage with highly diffuse
but positive social externalities: Neither the copyright holder nor the
purchaser of a copyrighted work are the direct beneficiaries of such external
effects, and so have no reason to take them into account. This in turn
implies that technical protections will typically be unable to accommodate
the many exemptions and exceptions to the Copyright Act, 61 many of which
are calibrated to capture just such benefits.
57. See supra p. 545.
58. See Benoliel, supra note 9, at 1091.
59. See id. at 1104.
60. Contra Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management:
Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in Digital Rights Management: Technological,
Economic, Legal and Political Aspects 597, 602-04 (Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003)
(arguing that future Digital Rights Management Systems ("DRM") technologies will be
sufficiently "malleable" to allow transformative reuses of protected content). The point that
I have made here regarding the inability of DRM to accommodate legal standards, as
underscored by Benoliel, supra note 9, and by Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 8, indicates
why Bechtold's assessment of future DRM is unduly rosy.
61. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1322 (2000).
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In previous work with Julie Cohen, I have shown that technological
controls tend to be relatively blunt instruments for control of digital content,
unable to accommodate copyright fair use without the re-introduction of
human discretion.62 Our suggestion for re-introducing human discretion
into DRM has, with some justification, been criticized as essentially
defeasing DRM of much of its predictability and so much of its benefit.63
As I have shown here, it is the deterministic, bright-line predictability of
DRM that makes it an attractive cost-saving mechanism to the copyright
holder. 64 But as I have also shown, savings to the copyright owner are not
the entirety of the social cost-benefit function. Locked into the rigid
determinism of ex ante design decisions, DRM will also incur the social
costs that would otherwise be minimized by the employment of legal
standards. Any cost-benefit balance reflected in the array of rights
privileges under the copyright statute is thus lost in technological
substitution.
III. TECHNICAL UNIFORMITY
While the deterministic "scripting" of DRM accommodates only legal
rules, rather than legal standards, it also drives DRM toward formation of
technical uniformity, as the same ex ante design process that shapes DRM's
function shapes its technical character. The development and promulgation
of uniform technical characteristics, or technical standards, has been a topic
of considerable attention in the regulation of competition and in innovation
policy. 65 That analysis is useful in the context of DRM promulgation as
well, although the nature of DRM standards and their legal milieu raise
heightened, possibly unique legal concerns.
"Standards" in this context, rather than referencing a type of legal
imperative, may be defined as a set of technical specifications that provide
common design features for a product or process.66 The potential benefits
of uniform technical standards and the problems attending incompatible
standards are commonplace knowledge. 67 As any traveler carrying an
electrical appliance has discovered, the costs of nonuniform technical
standards can be profound. Voltage, current, and plug configuration vary
enormously among different jurisdictions, requiring either expensive
duplication of compatible appliances, or a panoply of adapters and
62. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 41 (2001).
63. June M. Besek, Anti-circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the
Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 385, 490-91 (2004).
64. See Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 8.
65. See generally James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Anti-
Trust, and High Technology Industries, 64 Antitrust L.J. 247 (1995); Sean P. Gates,
Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of
Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 Emory L.J. 583 (1998).
66. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., 2 IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 35.1, at 35-3 (2002).
67. See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules 229 (1999).
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transformers allowing a noncompatible appliance to interoperate with the
local standards. Either compatibility strategy is cumbersome and costly.
The ability of the same traveler to place a telephone call from nearly
anywhere in the world to nearly anywhere else in the world speaks to the
value of long-fought and hard-won compatibility in a different technology
-telecommunications.
In each case of compatibility or incompatibility, this standardization
problem is intimately tied to the costs and benefits of network effects.
Network effects may arise in situations where the value of a system
increases as users are added.68 Purchasers of network goods find the good
increasingly valuable as others also purchase the good. Typically, the
increased value accrues to subsequent adopters, and accrues as a positive
externality. 69 For example, a telephone system is of relatively little value if
it has only two subscribers; each subscriber can call only one other
person. 70 The system is of greater value if it has more subscribers, because
each subscriber can then communicate with many others. Those who
subscribe to the system after it has accrued a large number of subscribers
may obtain a more valuable service than those who subscribed early, when
there were few other subscribers. At the same time, the value of the service
to the early subscribers grows as additional users sign on to the network.
This insight can be generalized to other types of human artifacts with
shared compatibility; languages, for example, may be thought of as goods
having network effects. The ability to interoperate internationally with a
wide diversity of individuals is illustrated by the benefits of speaking Greek
in the ancient Western world, Latin in the Medieval Western world, or
English in the current global era. As another well-studied and pertinent
example, many commentators have noted that computer operating systems
tend toward a uniform standard because of the natural benefits of a uniform
standard: Users need only invest in learning the characteristics of the
system once, technical support for a single standard is simple to provide,
and producers of compatible software applications need only develop
products to function with a single platform. 71
The Internet, for example, is a prime candidate for display of such
network externalities: Network access becomes more valuable as it
becomes more ubiquitous. 72 Much of the success of the Internet itself is
68. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424, 424 (1985).
69. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 133, 135 (1994) (distinguishing between positive and negative
network effects).
70. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 68, at 424 (citing telephones as an example of
network effects); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 69, at 139-40 (noting the telephone
system as a paradigmatic example of network effects).
71. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28
Conn. L. Rev. 1041, 1047-50 (1996) [hereinafter Antitrust]; Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary
Standard, 43 Antitrust Bull. 715 (1998)
72. See Antitrust, supra note 71, at 1047-50.
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due to the creation of a new type of physical network: The internetworking
protocols on which the Internet operates allow disparate types of computer
hardware, running many different software systems, to interact on a single
network. 73 Thus, users with previously incompatible equipment can now
join the same system and interoperate. Additionally, any given application
run on the network may show a different kind of network effect from usage:
E-mail, for example, is a more valuable service if it can be used more
widely. Similarly, the World Wide Web software application becomes
more valuable as it accumulates more reference linkages, allowing more
information to be indexed and accessed.
Both types of network activities are simultaneously possible because the
Internet exhibits more than one type of network effect. Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro have distinguished between these effects as actual and virtual
networks.74 Actual networks may be characterized as those that physically
interoperate with one another, virtual networks as those that share common
features without direct interoperation. To the extent that a system shares a
technical configuration that allows machines to physically interconnect, it
represents an actual network, whereas the benefits accruing from similarity
of software platforms or, for that matter, from the content on the system,
comprise a virtual network of shared compatibility. Where a common
technical standard is available, both types of beneficial effects may be
generated.75
At the same time, there exists a serious potential downside for any
standards-setting process. Networks may also produce negative effects, as
the cost of leaving the network, even when it would be socially desirable to
do so, may be prohibitively high.76 The likelihood of "lock-in" to an
inefficient standard remains a disputed, but nonetheless serious
consideration. 77 The concern in such situations is that once a standard is
adopted, network effects may raise the cost of changing to'a newer or better
alternative causing the standard to become permanently entrenched. This
may possibly occur where the short-term costs of switching away from the
old standard are greater than the long-term benefits of the new standard-
indeed, it has been argued that development of new standards may be
deterred if network effects raise the short-term cost of development and
deployment of the new standard above the perceived savings of a new
standard.
73. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925, 930-32 (2001).
74. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
Econ. Persp. 93, 95 (1994).
75. See Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?, in
Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge
Society 81, 88 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
76. See Mark A. Lernley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479, 551 (1998).
77. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 69, at 146-48; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & Econ. 1, 1 (1990).
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But because standard-setting is often beneficial, and indeed may be
critically important where network efficiencies can be realized,
development of standards is generally desirable, and may be facilitated by a
variety of mechanisms. 78 In some cases, the government may formally
mandate a standard. In other cases, actors in an industry may voluntarily
band together to settle on a standard; this may occur through informal
consultations or under the auspices of a more formal standard-setting
organization. In yet other cases, a de facto standard may arise
spontaneously, for example in an industry where a particular product
configuration or characteristic evolves to dominance.
In each of these cases, the development of standards carries potential
risks to competition, related to the potential negative consequences of
network effects. Most such concerns relate to anticompetitive manipulation
of the standards-setting process, or the standard itself, to achieve some form
of market dominance. 79  Private standard-setting organizations, for
example, may sometimes cloak anticompetitive cartel-like activity if their
membership is limited and conditions permit them to control adoption of
the standard. Closed standard-setting organizations might prevent
nonmember competitors from participating in determination of an industry
standard and, perhaps more importantly, may prevent nonmembers from
licensing proprietary technologies incorporated into a standard. Even
outside an organizational setting, it has been argued that a dominant
industry player may be able to arrange "tipping" of the market toward a
desired standard-presumably, toward a proprietary standard that can be
controlled or exploited. 80 Concern in this regard has been particularly keen
where the standard that is adopted, or which evolves to dominance, is
covered by patent, copyright, or similarly exclusive rights.
Like other computer technologies, DRM will be shaped by network
effects, and can be expected to converge towards a standard. Indeed, as a
practical matter, DRM will only work if all the publishers in a relevant
industry agree to employ it-otherwise, unauthorized copies will quickly
become available and proliferate from unprotected sources. As DRM
becomes ubiquitous, consumers and users of DRM and DRM-protected
content can be expected to seek the convenience and savings of compatible
devices and file formats. In some instances, industry groups such as the
DVD consortium have already developed DRM and DRM-compatible
standards for particular media.81 In other areas, such as digital music,
industry development of such standards has been an elusive goal, and the
lack of compatibility and interoperability between differing rights-managed
music formats has been a source of frustration to consumers.
78. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1896-1901 (2002).
79. See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies &
Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 117, 128 (1994).
80. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 105-06.
81. See Bechtold, supra note 60, at 631-37.
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DRM constraints themselves constitute a type of levy price increase on
the value of creative works-users who are accustomed to unimpeded
access to copyrighted works will be hampered in using what they have
purchased, losing the convenience of playing music or movies on different
types of equipment, the value of transferring content to an automobile or
portable playback system, and so on. Substantial DRM interference with
consumer use of the work effectively makes the work "overpriced,"
potentially causing consumers to complain, to switch their buying to other,
less obnoxious, forms of entertainment, or to switch to alternative versions
of the same content--depending on the comparative annoyance costs, the
content might perhaps be borrowed from friends, obtained from a library, or
downloaded from an unauthorized file-sharing source. Publishers will of
course have some incentive to assess and accommodate value that users
derive from some types of unimpeded access. As I have suggested above, it
is unclear that the publishers of technically protected content are in a good
position to assess such uses ex ante, and those costs not internalized by
consumers, and so not taken into account by publishers, remain a social
welfare concern. But diminution of the value of the content due to DRM
may provide some degree of market discipline, as publishers with the least
intrusive DRM, or perhaps those willing to forgo DRM, capture market
share from others whose DRM configurations restrict the value of their
content to consumers.
Consequently, while development of DRM standards carries with it the
usual concerns over network "lock-in," cartel behavior, and market
"tipping," many of the natural market safeguards against monopoly pricing,
such as new entry, should also apply; for example, defectors from such an
industry-wide DRM agreement might reap the rewards of lower annoyance
costs, at least in the short term, at the expense of competitors employing
DRM. But in the case of DRM, an additional set of considerations
heightens and exacerbates the usual concerns over anticompetitive conduct.
These concerns relate to the security of interoperable standards themselves.
The use of digital media requires the interoperation of a variety of software
and hardware devices. Content files do not exist in isolation, but require
devices to read and translate the files to output, to move files between
different locations in the computer, to copy the files to different formats
within the computer, and to perform a variety of other operations. But
because the security of rights-managed content might be compromised by
interaction with devices that are not themselves secured, dependable rights
management requires some form of protection or safeguard against insecure
devices. 82
The most secure approach is to simply decline or prohibit interoperation
with potentially insecure devices. Consequently, developers of rights
management systems have proposed the creation of trusted platforms that,
82. See Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted
Systems, in The Commodification of Information 343, 345-46 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil W.
Netanel eds., 2002).
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in essence, generate a secure perimeter for interoperation, and allow within
that perimeter only those devices judged to be safe. 83 In proposed systems
such as Microsoft's secure platform, formerly known as "Palladium," the
central processor of the computer, as the computer boots up, would
systematically examine, authenticate, and certify devices attached to the
system-that is to say, the processor would allow interaction only with
devices that were recognized as being secure. 84 Interaction with devices
that are not recognized, or that were deemed to be insecure, would be
declined. Under this approach the security concerns or "trust management"
protocols of DRM dictates the exclusion of devices that are technically
compatible, but untrusted.
As secured machines are networked, this strategy extends to trusted
content and rights management systems operating over the Internet or
similar computer networks. 85 The design of such distributed systems calls
for secure servers that would provide remote users with access to, or
content from, data and entertainment archives, but only on recognition of
trusted technical safeguards.8 6 Archived content would be packaged with
predetermined DRM controls instantiating the usage limitations specified
by the owner. Online requests for access to content, or for purchase and
download of content, would be honored only where the recipient machine
was certified as capable of securely implementing the bundled DRM. Thus,
the DRM protocols for automated acquisition of creative works, too, would
dictate exclusion of technically compatible but untrusted devices.
In a secured, rights-managed environment, therefore, interoperation and
the ability to produce viable interoperative products depend not only on the
standard for technical compatibility, but on the standard for defining and
implementing "trust."'8 7 A full discussion of the technical and operational
parameters of trust management lies well beyond the scope of this paper,88
but since security is never absolute, such parameters are not necessarily
objective in all dimensions, requiring at minimum a judgment as to how
secure is secure enough. Where interoperation is at issue, the potential for
considerable anticompetitive mischief may lie in such judgments; one can
well imagine the possessor of a dominant market position protecting that
position by excluding rival products from interoperation, ostensibly on
security concerns, but clandestinely on strategic criteria.8 9 Even if the
83. See generally Trusted Computing Platforms: TCPA Technology in Context (Siani
Pearson ed., 2003).
84. See Bechtold, supra note 60, at 638-39; Ross Anderson, 'Trusted Computing'
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-rja 14/tcpa-faq.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2005).
85. See Weinberg, supra note 82, at 345-47.
86. See Bechtold, supra note 60, at 639-41.
87. See generally Batya Friedman et al., Trust Online, Comm. ACM, Dec. 2000, at 34,
37-40.
88. For thorough treatments, see generally L. Jean Camp, Trust and Risk in Internet
Commerce (2000), and Comm. on Info. Sys. Trustworthiness, Trust in Cyberspace (Fred B.
Schneider ed., 1999).
89. See Bechtold, supra note 60, at 641-42.
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alleged security concerns leading to exclusion are wholly legitimate,
concealing no illegitimate anticompetitive motivation, the practical effect of
the exclusion may be the same, barring entry to innovative complementary
or competing products.
Of course, trust management exclusion is difficult if the technical criteria
for interoperation are known; competitors may simply design their products
to meet the technical standard and enter the market regardless. This entry
can be expected in an open market, and helps serve as a check on many
types of exclusive design strategies. DRM may be designed to monitor and
enforce its own trust criteria but such safeguards can themselves be
designed around. However, if legitimate competitors can design around the
technical safeguards against untrusted interoperation, so may technicians
with more nefarious goals in mind. By the same token, sheltering or
concealing the criteria of a technical security standard stymies not only
illegitimate attempts at access, but legitimate ones. This double-edged
result of standard suppression threatens normal market corrections that
depend upon the accessibility to DRM protocols. In particular, the ability
of new entrants or other competitors to gain unconsented access to technical
protocols necessary for interoperation has been greatly complicated by a
legal regime enacted to reinforce the security of DRM technologies.
IV. ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION LAW
I have argued above that, while design constraints and legal constraints
are to some extent interchangeable, these two substitutes may engage in
complex interaction: The two may complement and reinforce one
another. 90 The state may promulgate rules requiring manufacturers to
install seatbelt ignition interlocks, or may assign liability in such a way as
to induce their installation, but may also promulgate laws penalizing
consumers who disable the interlocks, in order to ensure that the regulatory
device has the intended effect. The same interrelationship holds true for
DRM. While proposals to require or induce use of DRM have not thus far
been adopted, 91 laws reinforcing the voluntary deployment of DRM have
been.
The rationale behind such laws maintains that where technology provides
the first line of defense against unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, the
legal protection needed to encourage creativity may not necessarily be
deterrence against violation of copyright or similar proprietary rights, but
rather legal deterrents against circumvention of technological protections. 92
In the United States, a legal deterrent of this kind has been enacted in the
form of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which prohibits
circumvention of technical protection measures, and trafficking in
90. See supra Parts I, I1.
91. See, e.g., S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002) (unenacted Consumer Broadband and Digital
Television Promotion Act); see also Bechtold, supra note 60, at 651-52.
92. See Schlachter, supra note 38, at 15, 38-48.
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technology that would facilitate such circumvention. 93  This statute
effectively provides content owners a new right of technological access,
seemingly independent of any intellectual property right. Language
promulgating similar legal measures has appeared in a recent European
Union Copyright Directive.94
In the United States, the statute was touted as legislation necessary to
fulfill the United States' obligations under the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty ("WIPO Treaty").95 However, the treaty
requires only that signatory states provide "adequate legal protection and
effective legal remedies" against circumvention of technological controls. 96
In the United States, such protection would already have been provided
under the doctrine of contributory infringement, which attributes copyright
liability to providers of technical devices that lack a substantial
noninfringing use. 97 This provision of U.S. law could have been employed
against a provision of so-called "black box" devices intended to circumvent
technological protections. 98  The compliance of U.S. law with the
requirements of the treaty was so substantial that the Clinton administration
initially considered submitting the WIPO Treaty to the Senate for
ratification without accompanying implementing legislation. 99
Instead, lobbying by content industries resulted in the enactment of so-
called "implementing" legislation containing anti-circumvention provisions
that far exceed anything contemplated by the treaty.' 00 Starkly put, the
DMCA on its face appears to create a new and unprecedented right to
control access to copyrighted works. The statute outlaws the act of
circumventing "a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title."'' It also prohibits "trafficking" or
providing the means to circumvent either technological access controls or
technological measures that control the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder: copy controls, display or performance controls, and so on.
Congress appears to have distinguished between access controls and usage
controls, allowing circumvention of the former but not the latter, in order to
93. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
94. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L. 167) 10.
95. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 532
(1999).
96. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 11
Stat. 2860, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1996).
97. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
98. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 369,
437 (1997); Samuelson, supra note 95, at 531.
99. See Samuelson, supra note 95, at 530.
100. Indeed, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") anti-circumvention
provisions contain language very close to that rejected by the treaty Diplomatic Conference
as overbroad and detrimental to the public domain. Id. at 413-15.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
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enable user privileges and exemptions. 10 2 In theory, a user would have to
obtain authorized access to a protected work, but having done so, could
without authorization circumvent usage controls to make fair or other
permissible uses. In reality, however, few content users have the skills to
circumvent the usage controls, and the statute prohibits those who have
such skills from assisting those who do not. Moreover, access controls are
essentially indistinguishable from usage controls, and as a practical matter
provide control of both access and use. 103
The Act provides for a handful of exceptions for purposes such as law
enforcement, encryption research, and security testing. The statutory
exceptions are confusing and somewhat contradictory, but are primarily
directed to the prohibition on circumvention; exceptions to providing
circumvention means are extremely limited. First, the Librarian of
Congress is empowered under the statute to periodically exempt certain
classes of works from the prohibition on access circumvention in order to
preserve selected access for socially valuable noninfringing uses. 104
Additionally, the statute incorporates several standing exceptions to the
access prohibition. Circumvention of technological controls is permitted
for legitimate governmental intelligence and law enforcement purposes. 105
Nonprofit library and educational institutions may circumvent in order to
make a good faith determination whether to acquire a copy of the protected
work.10 6 Circumvention is also permitted in order for software developers
to achieve interoperability among computer products, 10 7 for encryption
research, 10 8 and to test computer security. 10 9 Parents may circumvent in
order to prevent their children from accessing harmful content on the
Internet. 110 Individuals may circumvent in order to protect the privacy of
their "online activities."''1 The Act also incorporates statements that digital
equipment manufacturers are under no affirmative duty to design their
102. See R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls
Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 619, 648
(2003).
103. See, e.g., 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Meyer Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (classifying the Content Scrambling System technological control system for
DVDs as both an access control and a usage control); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same), aff'd sub nom. Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(D). In the first such rulemaking, which the Librarian
delegated to the Register of Copyrights, consideration of exemptions was limited to
situations in which actual harm from the inability to circumvent could already be shown.
Consequently, only two exemptions were granted, the first for circumvention of access
controls on works where the technological measures had malfunctioned, and a second for
parental access to the list of restricted sites in Internet-filtering software. See 37 C.F.R. §
201.40 (2005).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e).
106. Id. § 1201(d).
107. Id. § 1201(f).
108. Id. § 1201(g).
109. Id. § 1201(j).
110. Id. § 1201(h).
111. Id. § 1201(i).
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products to accommodate particular content control systems. 112 The Act
also states that the anti-circumvention provisions are not intended to alter
copyright remedies, limitation, and defenses such as fair use; 113 to broaden
contributory or vicarious copyright liability; 114 or to enlarge or diminish
rights of free speech or press activities involving consumer electronics,
telecommunications, or computing products. 115
The DMCA anti-circumvention device provisions are directed to two
different types of technological measures. The first is directed to devices
that circumvent technological measures that control access to a copyrighted
work.116 The second is directed to devices that circumvent technological
measures that protect the rights of a copyright holder in a work or portion of
a work. 11 7  Each provision prohibits the manufacture, importation,
provision, public offering, or trafficking in a technology, product, service,
device, component, or part thereof if primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing, has only limited commercially significant
purposes or use other than to circumvent, or is knowingly marketed for use
in circumvention. 118
These device provisions are subject to confusing and contradictory
exceptions that are narrower than the seven exceptions to the provision
prohibiting acts of circumvention. Circumvention devices necessary for
interoperability are privileged, 119 but devices for law enforcement and
privacy reasons are not. Devices necessary to circumvent access controls
are privileged for encryption and for security research, 120 but devices to
circumvent rights controls for the same purposes are not. There is no
provision for devices necessary to gain access or circumvent rights controls
in order to make fair use or other uses permissible under the Copyright Act
despite the statements in the DMCA that it was not intended to alter such
privileges. 121
This apparent inflexibility in the statute should perhaps be unsurprising.
The purpose of backing the integrity of technical controls by statute is to
shift enforcement of the rights-holder's interest from penalties for
unauthorized infringement to penalties for unauthorized access. Given that
DRM is only able to channel user conduct into dependably secure behaviors
when its architecture is predictable and deterministic, the legal imperatives
that guard the technical controls must be equally predictable and
deterministic. Just as technical regulation under DRM cannot
accommodate the fact-dependent, ex post flexibility of legal standards, so
112. Id. § 1201(c)(3).
113. Id. § 1201(c)(1).
114. Id. § 1201(c)(2).
115. Id. § 1201(c)(4).
116. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
117. Id. § 1201(b)(1).
118. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C), (b)(1)(A)-(C).
119. Id. § 1201(f)(2).
120. Id. § 1201(g)(4), 0)(4).
121. Id. § 1201(c)(1)-(2).
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the accompanying legal regulation of circumvention resists such situational
flexibility.
By adopting ex ante, deterministic legal imperatives, anti-circumvention
laws, acting as an adjunct to deterministic technological controls, confer
upon content owners a degree of control over creative works never
attainable under a regime of traditional copyright.' 22  The rule-based
approach assumes that both Congress and copyright holders can determine
ex ante the proper balance of cost and benefit, but as described previously,
whenever unforeseen or unanticipated costs arise, a rules-based approach
will fail to properly calibrate behavior.1 23  One potential result of the
DMCA approach, unaccounted for in the calculus of creative incentives,
may be that this combination of legal and technical control drives the
promulgation of monolithic DRM technical standards: by deterring
legitimate circumvention of DRM, the DMCA provisions help to "lock in"
the dominant technical standard by frustrating interoperation or replacement
by competing products. Thus, unprecedented control over content
potentially confers unprecedented market power on the developer of the
dominant technical standard, facilitating anti-competitive conduct.
V. ANTI-COMPETITIVE APPLICATIONS
The potential for the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions to foster anti-
competitive conduct has already become apparent. In the relatively short
time since their enactment, the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions have
been invoked in a handful of cases and reported incidents. Courts have
typically been sympathetic to such claims when the incidents have reached
the point of judicial action, although recent appellate opinions may signal a
shift toward greater skepticism over DMCA claims. This shift may stem
from a pattern of litigation in which misappropriation of technically
protected content is seldom present, suppression of competitive products
seems a likely motivation, and the claims brought have become increasingly
divorced from the entertainment piracy that Congress initially intended to
deter by passage of the DMCA.
The earliest cases asserted under the anti-circumvention statutes bore at
least a nominal connection to entertainment piracy, although the issue of
control over non-entertainment products was never far distant. The claims
in Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes were based upon circumvention of a
technical control system known as the Content Scrambling System
("CSS"), which was designed to secure access to DVD movie discs. 124 A
key feature of the system was that the software controls embedded in the
disc allowed discs to be played only on approved consumer playback
122. Cf. Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1630 (2001) (arguing that the emergence of new technology may
justify granting copyright owners a higher degree of control over works).
123. See supra pp. 545-55.
124. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes (Reimerdes 1), 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction).
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machines.' 25 Machines manufactured in different geographic areas were
designed to allow access to the content of a given DVD only if the disc was
coded to be played in that corresponding geographic area, thus allowing
significant control over the timing and distribution of movies released in
different parts of the globe. The corollary to this technological control
system is that DVDs may only be played on approved playback equipment,
whose manufacturer has built the equipment for use with the control
system.
In response to this limitation, a fifteen-year-old Norwegian youth
developed a program that he called "DeCSS," designed to circumvent the
access controls, purportedly in order to allow DVDs to be played on non-
approved playback systems. 126 Use of the DeCSS program would thus
allow DVDs purchased in one area of the world to be played on equipment
that would otherwise be geographically incompatible. It would also allow
DVDs to be played on unapproved playback equipment, and in particular,
allow the discs to be played on a Linux operating system platform, for
which no approved device existed.127 The owners of DVD content, the
movie studios, alleged that the DeCSS "hacking tool" violated the DMCA
provisions prohibiting trafficking in circumvention devices, and
successfully filed suit to prevent various web sites from either directly
distributing the program or offering hypertext links to other sites where it
might be found. 128 Both the district court and the appellate court hearing
the case rejected any claim that the First Amendment might privilege
distribution of DeCSS computer code, or that owners of DVDs might be
entitled to such a tool in order to engage in fair use. The court determined
instead that Congress had intended to create a new form of protection for
technologically secured works, and had no obligation to ensure that this
new statutory scheme accommodated consumers in exercising their fair use
under copyright law. 129
While the DMCA claims brought in Reimerdes were ostensibly advanced
to protect the integrity of movies from unauthorized duplication, the
practical outcome was that DVD movie playback remained tied to approved
systems-effectively controlling a market for consumer electronics that was
well beyond the intellectual property interest in copyrighted movies.
Control over interoperable technology, rather than an explosion of
unauthorized copying, seemed similarly at the heart of the DMCA dispute
in RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.,130 a DMCA action brought by the
publisher of a popular software package used to receive music or video
"streams" via the Internet. The RealPlayer receiver software, which would




128. Reimerdes I, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
129. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001).
130. No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
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typically be installed on a user's desktop machine, achieves connection with
a RealPlayer music or video server elsewhere on the network through a
"secret handshake" protocol that allows the server and receiver to recognize
one another. 131 Once a connection is achieved, the system contains a
feature to determine whether the user of the receiver has obtained rights to
copy the music files sent by the server, or only to listen to the music as it is
sent. 132
The defendant Streambox produced a competing receiver, as well as
several other pieces of software designed to be interoperable with the
RealPlayer system. In order to play RealPlayer signals, the Streambox
receiving components connected with the RealPlayer server by emulating
the "secret handshake" protocol. 133 However, once the connection was
established, the Streambox product lacked the restriction feature that would
prevent unauthorized copying of streamed music or video. RealNetworks
brought suit against Streambox, alleging that the latter's receiving
components constituted a "circumvention device" under the DMCA. In an
unpublished opinion, the court granted the preliminary injunction, holding
that the emulation of the "secret handshake" protocol constituted a
circumvention of the RealPlayer restriction features. 134
The most striking feature of this opinion is that no content owner
appears-although the DMCA was purportedly enacted to protect owners
of copyrighted content, only producers of competing software technology
were involved in the RealNetworks action. No pirating or unauthorized
reproduction of any copyrighted content was shown, only the production of
an interoperable product that could have been used to produce unauthorized
copies of content. The facts may be viewed as an attempt by a software
publisher to impede or abolish the distribution of a rival product, and at a
minimum the case demonstrates that the statute could be turned to such
purposes.
Subsequent DMCA cases have moved yet farther away from claims
related to copyright piracy, instead asserting anti-circumvention claims
where unapproved uses of copyrighted works might disrupt the producer's
preferred marketing scheme-a problem seen in Reimerdes, but having
many other incarnations. For example, in Sony Computer Entertainment
America Inc. v. Game Masters the alleged circumvention device was an
add-on module to the PlayStation videogame console.1 35 The device, called
a "Game Enhancer," could be used to speed up or increase the difficulty of
Sony games. 136 But the device was also sold with instructions on how to
use a U.S.-marketed console to play games intended for sale only in Europe
131. Id. at *6.
132. Id. at *6-7.
133. Id. at *11.
134. Id. at *19-20.
135. Sony Computer Entm't Am. Inc. v. Game Masters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 977 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
136. Id. at 981.
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or Japan. 137 Much like the DVD CSS territory codes in Reimerdes, the
PlayStation console was designed to operate when encrypted data from a
game CD verified that the game was a Sony product authorized for
distribution in the same geographical territory as the console. The "Game
Enhancer" instructions allowed players to initialize a U.S. game, then
temporarily turn control of the console over to the Game Enhancer while
the U.S. game was removed and an import game inserted and loaded. 138
Control was then turned back over to the console's operating system, which
would execute the game software based on the previous authorization. The
court concluded that this constituted circumvention of a technological
measure in violation of the DMCA, and that distribution of the Game
Enhancer violated the DMCA trafficking provisions. 139
The anti-circumvention claims in Game Masters were intended to
suppress the use of lawfully purchased game cartridges in a manner
contrary to the copyright holder's wishes. Control over post-purchase use
of legitimate software was similarly at issue in the DMCA claims brought
in Davidson & Associates v. Internet Gateway.140 The plaintiff, Blizzard
Entertainment, was the publisher of a variety of popular computer video
games, whose games included a "multiplayer mode" that would allow
players to play against one another by means of the Internet. This online
multiplayer service, called Battle.net, authenticated players by means of an
encrypted "secret handshake" sequence. 141 When game users log onto
Battle.net, the service requests the authentication sequence that
accompanied the purchased game. If the sequence given is recognized as
belonging to a purchased game, and is not already in play, the service
permits access. 142
The defendants in the case were the volunteer developers of an
alternative, open source network, called the "bnetd" project, which was
intended to offer the same experience as Battle.net, but avoid certain
difficulties or objectionable materials users experienced on Battle.net. Like
Battle.net, the bnetd software would allow Blizzard game players to interact
in multiplayer mode over the Internet. In order to allow players to interact
in multiplayer mode, it was necessary for the bnetd developers to reverse
engineer Blizzard software and protocols. 143 It was also necessary for the
bnetd system to interact with the individual game software modules via the
"secret handshake" protocol, although bnetd was not designed to check the
game sequence to determine if the sequence belonged to a purchased game
or was already in play. 144
137. Id.
138. Id. at 981-82.
139. Id. at 987.
140. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
141. Id. at 1169.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1172.
144. Id. at 1171-73.
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Blizzard sued the bnetd developers for anti-circumvention violations.
Relying on previous decisions such as Game Masters, the district court
found the developers to be trafficking in access circumvention tools that
gave unauthorized access to the Battle.net mode of the games. 145 The court
rejected the notion that the access users of the bnetd system, who were
lawful purchasers of the Blizzard games, were engaged in authorized access
by virtue of owning the games. The court was convinced, instead, that the
owners of the games lacked lawful permission to circumvent the Battle.net
technical protections. 146 Similarly, the court decided that the DMCA
reverse engineering exception did not apply, because the bnetd developers
were not seeking interoperability of an "independently created computer
program," but rather were producing a substitute for Battle.net. 147 Such a
substitute product was held not to be a legitimate object for the reverse
engineering exception.
The use of the anti-circumvention provisions to exclude from the
marketplace not threats to the technical protection of a copyrighted product,
but interoperable products that might disturb copyright holder's plans for an
adjacent market, is troubling. But by far the most egregious employment of
the DMCA has been to block the sale of competing products in consumer
devices with no relationship whatsoever to copyright piracy. A claim of
this sort was brought in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,148 where a manufacturer of computer printers filed a
DMCA circumvention infringement suit against the manufacturer of
computer chips incorporated into competing new or refilled ink
cartridges. 149 Lexmark, a major computer printer manufacturer, sells both
printers and ink toner cartridges. The cartridges are recognized by the
printer via a software authentication sequence programmed into a chip in
the cartridge. 150 Rival manufacturers' refilled aftermarket cartridges would
not function with the printer unless they mimicked this sequence. 151 The
district court held that by providing chips that allow rival cartridges to be
recognized by the printer, defendant Static Control was trafficking in a tool
circumventing a technological measure, because the program in the
cartridge chip "controlled access" to the printer software. 152 The district
court also rejected the defendant's defense under the reverse engineering
provisions of the DMCA, holding that the accused devices did not comprise
"independently created computer programs," but only copies of the
Lexmark printer control programs. 153 The court expressly rejected the
suggestion that the DMCA provisions were targeted against copyright
145. Id. at 1186-87.
146. Id. at 1185.
147. Id.
148. 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
149. Id. at 947.
150. Id. at 952.
151. Id. at 952-53.
152. Id. at 969.
153. Id. at 971.
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piracy, 154 reasoning that this goal would have been accomplished by the
DMCA usage circumvention provisions, rendering the access provisions
"surplussage."1 55
Similar anti-circumvention claims have also been asserted over the
interoperability of garage door openers, a product perhaps even farther
removed from entertainment copyright piracy than printer ink cartridges. In
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., the plaintiff, a
manufacturer of garage door opening equipment, attempted to exclude from
the market "universal" remote control units that were designed to function
as a backup or replacement remote control for its own remote control
devices. 156 The Chamberlain remote control used a rolling code that would
shift from use to use, purportedly in order to avoid the possibility that a
burglar might capture the code beamed from the remote control and use the
captured code to open the garage door, allowing unauthorized entry to the
home. In order to interoperate with the door-opening mechanism, the
Skylink universal remote was developed to emulate the rolling code.
Chamberlain sued, claiming that the Skylink devices circumvented a
technical measure that protected the security code.
In this case, however, a skeptical district court concluded that
Chamberlain's DMCA claims for trafficking in an anti-circumvention
device failed. 157 In particular, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to show lack of authorization to access the security code because the
purchasers had an expectation or implied license to use the garage-opening
device they purchased with a second compatible remote control. Thus, the
competitor Skylink could not be supplying a device for unauthorized
access. This holding, of course, left open the possibility that such a license
might be revoked by a restrictive express license, such as a mass-market
"shrink-wrap" contract, but such a contract claim was not at issue in the
suit.
And surprisingly, on appeal, the Federal Circuit not only upheld the
district court's result, but expanded and amplified the holding in an opinion
with potentially broad applicability to DMCA claims targeted at
noninfringing interoperable devices. 158 The appellate opinion focused on
the lack of any relationship between the access enabled by the Skylink
device and a copyrighted work. The court factually distinguished cases
such as Reimerdes, and the trial court opinion in Lexmark, as involving an
allegation of copyright infringement. 159 Chamberlain, in contrast, had
alleged no infringement of its underlying software or any other
copyrightable work. Indeed, the Federal Circuit agreed with the trial court
that authorization for use of the door-opening software was implied in the
154. Id. at 969.
155. Id.
156. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
157. Id. at 1187.
158. Id. at 1204.
159. Id. at 1199.
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purchase of the Chamberlain product, precluding a claim of unauthorized
exercise of an exclusive right of the copyright holder.
The Federal Circuit also rejected language from previous decisions, such
as that in Reimerdes, suggesting that the DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions should be read as creating a new right of access to protected
works. 160 The court was particularly exercised to reject any proposal that
the anti-circumvention provisions create a new form of property right. 161
According to the Federal Circuit opinion, Congress intended the DMCA
anti-circumvention provisions to secure the technical protection of
copyrighted works, and not as a new set of legal privileges in their own
right. Thus, the opinion treats the anti-circumvention provisions as
prohibiting only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the
rights granted by the Copyright Act. 162
Close on the heels of the Chamberlain decision, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals repudiated the determination of the trial court in the Lexmark
case. 163 Like the appellate opinion in Chamberlain, the appellate opinion
in Lexmark rather clearly displays the court's concern that Lexmark's
DMCA claims had nothing to do with the pirating of music or other
copyrighted content, but rather, constituted a fairly naked attempt to
suppress competition in the market for printer ink cartridges. The appellate
opinion sharply reversed the trial court's reasoning, holding that the
Lexmark codes utilized by the Static Control chips did not control "access"
to the printer software-the software code was not encrypted or otherwise
protected by technical measures. 164 By purchasing a printer, the court
reasoned, an owner could access, read, and alter the software at will.
Neither did the court accept that the codes controlled access to the printer
software in the sense of controlling its use. 165 Additionally, the Sixth
Circuit appeared sympathetic to a broader interpretation of the DMCA
reverse-engineering provision, holding that the Static Control chip
contained software that appeared to constitute "independently created"
programs for which interoperability was needed; consequently, the reverse-
engineering exception might apply to Static Control's activities. 166
When taken together, these appellate opinions suggest that the judicial
system is becoming aware of the potential for abuse of the DMCA, and is
searching for limitations to the broad approval articulated in earlier
decisions. It remains unclear how robust these particular results will be.
The Chamberlain decision relies heavily on the lack of a copyright claim to
distinguish the case from previous cases applying the anti-circumvention
provisions. In one sense, this distinction moves in the correct direction,
160. Id. at 1197-99.
161. Id. at 1204.
162. Id. at 1202-03.
163. Lexmark Int'l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
164. Id. at 547-50.
165. Id. at 550.
166. Id. at 550-51.
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tying the DMCA back to its original purpose as a deterrent against
copyright piracy. But as a practical matter, the inclusion of a copyright
claim seems all that is necessary to place future cases into the same
category as the claims in Reimerdes or Streambox. Incorporating an
allegation of copyright infringement into an anti-circumvention action
presents a rather low threshold for DMCA claims; because technical
protections will nearly always include some software component, inclusion
of a copyright claim to accompany circumvention claims will be routine,
even if no digital content is truly at risk.
Additionally, the Chamberlain appellate opinion, as the trial court
opinion, leaves open the use of mass-market licenses to prevent reverse
engineering or interoperation of technically protected devices with
unauthorized devices. Although the Chamberlain court declined to reach
the question of whether circumvention could be prohibited by mass-market
contract, 16 7 Federal Circuit precedent might be read to allow such a
prohibition. 168  The Lexmark decision also relies heavily on access
privileges inferred from purchase of a device, when such privileges could in
theory be restricted by "shrink-wrap" boilerplate. If such uses of "shrink-
wrap" are permissible, then boilerplate licenses might be employed to
negate whatever limits have been placed on strategic overreaching by
means of the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions.
VI. COMPETITIVE ANTIDOTES
I have argued that, like any other interoperable computer technology,
DRM will tend toward a single standard, and simultaneously toward
whatever concerns over monopolization or restraint of trade that come with
such network effects. Additionally, the secure computing features of DRM
will tend to resist the market forces that would naturally tend to ameliorate
such concerns. But it is the approach to anti-circumvention law adopted in
decisions such as Reimerdes, Blizzard, and the trial court Lexmark opinion
that most greatly heightens the danger of such anticompetitive effects. The
facts of these cases illustrate the kind of anticompetitive uses to which anti-
circumvention claims might be put, and the reasoning in such opinions
essentially blesses the most pernicious application of the DMCA
provisions.
The development of technical standards in general has been recognized
as raising concerns under both section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which prohibits conspiracies to restrain trade, 169 and under section 2 of the
Act, which prohibits monopolization or attempted monopolization. 170
Under section 1, there may be concern that standard-setting organizations
will act as cartels to exclude new entrants; under section 2, there may be
167. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202 n.17.
168. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
170. Id. § 2.
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concern that the owner of a proprietary standard will exploit network effects
to dominate a particular market. On rare occasions, courts have also
recognized certain design choices as technological attempts to "tie" together
interoperable products, effectively excluding consumer adoption of
products produced by competitors because of technological
incompatibility. 171 Such "predatory design" situations might be penalized
as a form of antitrust violation if anticompetitive intent, rather than
technological benefit, prompted the design. 172 This kind of antitrust claim
has been controversial, 173 and in its present form could be difficult to
employ if incompatibility is claimed for the purpose of "secure computing."
The difficulty of formulating an antitrust claim under either section of the
Sherman Act stems from the need for a "rule of reason" balancing
approach, comparing benefits to detriments. 174 In general, standard setting,
whether for DRM or other forms of interoperation, will create a variety of
pro-competitive benefits: the creation of compatible consumer products,
enhancement of positive network effects, and avoidance of incompatible
products that could leave consumers "stranded" when other standards
become dominant. Typically, many of these benefits can be captured by
firms that are not part of the standard-setting process. Indeed, some
commentators on standard-setting organizations have raised the concern
that follow-on firms might "free ride" on the standard-setting process,
avoiding the costs of standard setting by not participating in the process, but
reaping the rewards of compatibility by following the standard once it is in
place. 175
Whether or not such free riding is in itself desirable, it mitigates concern
over anticompetitive exclusion; once a standard is established, firms can
typically, at essentially zero cost, adopt the established standard and
incorporate it into their products so that markets and consumers will
benefit. But the ability to adopt a standard assumes accessibility to or
familiarity with that standard. Analyses of standard setting that rely upon
open adoption of standards likewise assume that firms in the marketplace
will be able to comprehend and mimic the standard through examination or
reverse engineering of the products incorporating the standard. Under such
171. See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., 1 IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 12.3c (2002).
172. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th
Cir. 1976).
173. See Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
1121, 1148-49 (1983) (arguing against recognition of claims for anticompetitive design).
But see Janusz A. Ordover, Alan 0. Sykes & Robert D. Willig, Predatory Systems Rivalry:
A Reply, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1150 (1983) (refuting Sidak's critique of predatory design
claims).
174. See Michael A. Carrier, Why Antitrust Should Defer to the Intellectual Property
Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: A Commentary on Teece & Sherry, 87 Minn. L.
Rev. 2019, 2032 (2003).
175. See Carrier, supra note 174, at 2032-33; Antitrust, supra note 71, at 1053; David J.
Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1913, 1980
(2003).
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conditions, the anticompetitive effects of network "lock-in" will be at least
somewhat ameliorated by the threat of new entry, so long as new entrants
can adopt or adapt the standard.
Such standards adoption may be frustrated if the standard is protected by
intellectual property rights so that reverse engineering and adoption of the
standard may constitute intellectual property infringement. 176 Patents pose
a particular problem in this context, as patent law contains no reverse
engineering provision, and indeed, hardly any exemptions from
infringement at all. 17 7 Copyright has on occasion been interposed to
prevent reverse engineering of software products, 178 but presents less of a
problem than patents due to a line of cases holding that copying in the
course of reverse engineering may constitute fair use. 179 Either form of
exclusive right could in theory be employed to anticompetitive effect in
violation of the antitrust law, but the general trend, especially for patents,
has increasingly been one of deference to the right holder, making the limit
of impermissible exclusion increasingly remote.
As a consequence, commentators have given considerable attention to the
problem of standards promulgation when that standard is covered by a
patent, including discussion of the proper role of antitrust and misuse law in
deterring the anticompetitive effects of proprietary standards. 180 But the
problems identified in this regard may be far more common, or greatly
exacerbated, when the standard involves DRM. In order to remain secure,
such devices will typically be designed to resist casual examination and
interoperation with non-trusted devices. Reverse engineering of such
devices will require circumvention of their security measures. Thus,
detailed examination of DRM standards, including decryption and reverse
engineering, will likely run afoul of the DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions, creating a legal deterrent to competitive or interoperable
products.
As interpreted in Reimerdes and similar cases, the anti-circumvention
provisions may therefore play the role that patents sometimes play in
suppressing device interoperation.' 81  When interpreted as a type of
exclusory right, these provisions force firms that wish to adopt the DRM
standard to ask for permission for a license; if the license is denied,
176. See Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1043, 1048-51(2002).
177. See Maureen O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum.
L. Rev. 1177, 1220-36 (2000).
178. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1094-
95 (1995).
179. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (2001); O'Rourke, supra note 177, at 1220-21.
180. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 761 (2002); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry
Standards, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 623 (2002); Patterson, supra note 176; Mark R. Patterson,
When is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133 (2000).
181. See Cohen, supra note 178, at 1190, 1198-99 (1995).
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attempting self-help violates the DRM owner's anti-circumvention right.
The fair use exemption for reverse engineering would not apply, since
under this view circumvention is prohibited for both fair use and foul.
Neither is the DMCA reverse-engineering exception likely to be available;
by its own terms it applies only to software interoperation, and the analysis
in cases such as Blizzard limits the exception further to "independent"
products that are not substitutes for the work examined.
The result of this approach would allow DRM developers to leverage
technical standards into aftermarket monopolies covering a wide range of
interoperable devices and substitutes-precisely the pattern of exclusion
seen in the DMCA cases up until Chamberlain. The Chamberlain and
Lexmark opinions radically change the trend begun in Reimerdes by
reinterpreting the statute to avoid the strategic behavior that had begun to
emerge from the most obvious reading of the statute. The Federal Circuit's
language rejected the proposition that the anti-circumvention provisions
create a new form of property right, effectively transforming the anti-
circumvention provisions into a sort of "super contributory" infringement.
Analytically, this ties anti-circumvention claims back to copyright,
reintroducing into the anti-circumvention provisions the standards-based
determinations found in the Copyright Act-if for example, the use of the
protected content was fair, no anti-circumvention claim would lie.
At the same time, the Chamberlain and appellate Lexmark opinions also
recognize that the development of DRM is not exempt from the prohibitions
of antitrust law and doctrines of misuse. Both opinions leave open the
possibility of contractual access prohibitions, which in combination with
the anti-circumvention prohibitions could cross the line into anticompetitive
conduct. The Chamberlain approach rejects the formulation of anti-
circumvention rights as separate from copyright. But even were the
Reimerdes approach to prevail, and the anti-circumvention provisions
considered to constitute a separate property right, the opinion recognizes
that it would still be constrained by antitrust law. Similarly, the opinion
seems to caution against permitting copyright owners to use combinations
of technical protections and contract to prohibit certain uses, such as fair
uses of a copyrighted work, when the public has "an inherent legal right" to
such uses. 182 Antitrust seems to be at least one suggested limitation to
overreaching under either a contractual or property-based theory, as the
antitrust claims that have been at issue in previous standards setting, such as
claims of tying or concerted refusal to deal, may, for the reasons I have
indicated above, be heightened in the DRM milieu.
The Chamberlain opinion also suggests a role for the related, but
separate, doctrine of misuse. I have similarly argued that misuse might be
pressed into service to curtail overreaching under the DMCA. 183 This
182. Id. at 1202.
183. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1095, 1096-97
(2003).
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employment of misuse seems highly appropriate if anti-circumvention is
viewed as a collection of rights separate from copyright in the underlying
technically protected work-a position vehemently rejected by the
Chamberlain opinion.184 But misuse remains an appropriate antidote for
overreaching even if the anti-circumvention provisions are viewed as a form
of super-contributory infringement. The doctrine of misuse acted for many
years as a foil or counterbalance to expansive contributory infringement in
patent law, and appears to be taking on much the same role in copyright.1 85
Misuse might well undertake a similar function regarding a new "super"
contributory infringement right under the DMCA.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have examined certain social costs of deploying digital
rights management, or DRM systems to protect copyrighted content,
although I have limited my examination to "hard" systems directed to active
control or prohibition of content usage. I have not considered "soft" DRM
measures, such as steganography or "watermarking," that might enhance
detection and enforcement of existing legal prohibitions, and so indirectly
deter certain user behaviors. "Hard" technologies have been the subject of
intense interest by content producers, as these technologies hold the
promise of self enforcement.
But the calculus of costs and benefits for such technical self-help is
highly complex, and the prospect for successful self-help via such measures
is uncertain. The nature of this technology tends away from the
embodiment of legal standards, but toward the formulation of uniform
technical standards. The first trend implicates heightened costs from ex
ante design of behavioral constraints; it seems unlikely that content
producers possess sufficient information about the uses of content in order
to make a correct decision regarding the design of DRM restrictions. Some
consideration for the value of overly restricted access may be reflected in
lower prices for DRM-restricted products; however, much of the value of
unrestricted access may be unpredictable or diffuse.
The second trend suggests strategic reasons as to why content developers
may have improper or insufficient incentives for taking into account
consumer preferences or value. DRM will tend not only toward a technical
standard, but toward a technical standard that may be uniquely susceptible
to strategic manipulation. This susceptibility appears to have been
reinforced by the passage of anti-circumvention legislation that in fact lends
itself to an anti-reverse-engineering interpretation. Recent appellate cases
involving the anti-circumvention provisions suggest that courts are willing
to reinterpret the statute in order to deter the most egregious behavior
fostered by such an interpretation. But it is unclear how robust this
184. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1199, 1202-03
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
185. See Burk, supra note 183, at 1115-18, 1124.
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reinterpretation might be, inviting a reconsideration of competition
doctrines such as predatory design and misuse in the context of DRM
standards.
Notes & Observations
